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Abstract: Military justice has never been intended as an exact replica 
of civilian justice. Historically, the need to maintain discipline under 
the enormous stress of combat and the high stakes of war impelled 
all militaries to create a separate and, in many ways, unique justice 
system. The result is a criminal law process in which military needs 
sometimes must take precedence over certain rights-centered formal-
isms of a nation's civilian justice system. However, beginning with the 
adoption of the Uniform Code of Military Justice in 1951, the two u.s. 
systems have become increasingly close, with the importation into 
the military realm of many of the procedural protections of the civil-
ian system. Military justice retains its distinctive features, including 
the criminalization of absence, cowardice, and insubordination, as 
well as other offenses without civilian counterpart but which are 
indispensable for what the Supreme Court calls the armed forces' 
"separate society." In addition, some procedural differences continue 
to exist, including command selection of military "juries," as well 
as an appellate court system empowered to review de novo factual 
findings of a court-martial. Recently, the use of military commis-
sions-which are separate from courts-martial-have been revised to 
address war crimes committed by nonstate actors. Today, issues have 
arisen about the ability of the military justice system to operate inde-
pendently and effectively. In part, this is the result of well-intended 
efforts over several decades to "civilianize" and "judicialize" its 
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processes-modifications that have often proven ill-suited to combat 
zones. Even more problematic is the tendency of political leaders and 
interest groups to encroach on the role of commanders in military 
justice matters, and to inject other political influences that threaten 
the military justice system's independence and effectiveness. 
Groucho Marx, so the story goes, once qUipped that "military jus-
tice is to justice what military music is to music." To the distress 
of many in the armed forces, as well as to admirers of its justice 
system, that wisecrack continues to describe the military's criminal 
jurisprudence in the minds of many Americans. 
As with much humor, however, there is some truth in Marx's jest. 
Just as military music has served a martial purpose for eons-trum-
pets did a pretty good job for Joshua and the Israelites at the battle 
of Jericho-so too has military justice served war fighters since vir-
tually the beginning of organized conflict, because it plays a central 
role in establishing the discipline indispensable for martial success. 
In the Anabasis, Xenophon observed that "if discipline is held to be 
of saving virtue, the want of it has been the ruin of many ere now."! 
Maurice de Saxe, in his 1732 treatise on war, Mes Reveries, contends 
that the "Romans conquered all peoples by their discipline. In the 
measure that it became corrupted their success decreased." For his 
part, George Washington bluntly insisted that" discipline is the soul 
of an army. It makes small numbers formidable; procures success to 
the weak, and esteem to all." 
All of this suggests that military justice is not-and never has 
been-intended to be simply a doppelganger for a civilian criminal 
justice system. Unlike its civilian counterpart, it is designed to help 
execute, if necessary, the difficult-and melancholy-task of getting 
human beings to kill, in the name of the state, and do so under cir-
cumstance where their opponents are bent upon doing the same to 
them. The current U.S. Manual for Courts-Martial (MCM) puts this 
stark purpose more delicately and rather more elliptically when it 
explains that "the purpose of military law is to promote justice, to 
assist in maintaining good order and discipline in the armed forces, 
to promote efficiency and effectiveness in the military establish-
ment, and thereby strengthen the national security of the United 
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States."2 Across nations, cultures, and time, military discipline has 
typically been unapologetically and, indeed, often necessarily, dra-
conian. Throughout history, misbehaving soldiers have been pun-
ished in a variety of frightening ways, to include at times torture, 
maiming, and even summary execution. During the Revolutionary 
era, for example, the British army would impose punishments of up 
to one thousand lashes for relatively minor offenses. 
In a way, it is not hard to understand why such harsh measures were 
needed: the tactics and weapons of the eighteenth century required 
troops to march shoulder to shoulder to within seventy-five yards of 
their adversary. At that point the infantrymen would fire volley after 
volley into the similarly packed ranks of their adversary to achieve 
the effect of mass fire with their oft-inaccurate muskets. Additionally, 
the crammed-together troops might also face withering exchanges of 
cannon fire from almost point-blank range. Anyone injured in such 
blasts faced, at best, the horrifying prospect of rudimentary medical 
care, including the high probability of amputation. It took uncom-
promising discipline to steel soldiers for this terrifying environment. 
Given such verities, it is un surprising that the Continental army 
adopted Britain's military justice code, the Articles of War, with 
relatively few changes. That system, with periodic adjustments and 
improvements, largely persisted through World War II. In that con-
flict, which saw sixteen million Americans serving in uniform, over 
two million courts-martial of u.s. troops took place. Most of those 
trials were conducted without lawyers or legally trained personnel, 
and this and other deficiencies led to much criticism after the war. 
As one commentator put it, 
Many of these citizens also had some very unpleasant experiences 
with the military justice system. At that time, the military justice sys-
tem looked quite different than it does today and did not offer accused 
the protections afforded by the civilian courts system. It was a system 
that was foreign to many American citizens and they disapproved of 
the way criminal law was being applied in the military.3 
To address these concerns, Congress passed major reform legiS-
lation in 1951 that replaced the Articles of War with the Uniform 
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Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).4 The new law regularized discipli-
nary processes throughout the several service branches, provided 
for consistent rules of evidence, and embedded legally trained par-
ticipants more deeply into the system. In addition, it established 
the all-civilian Court of Military Appeals (CMA), which is now 
known as the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (or CAAF). 
Importantly, this tribunal-like the entire military justice system-
was established by Congress as an "Article I" court under its con-
stitutional powers,s as opposed to a part of the judicial branch of 
government, which is governed by Article III of the Constitution. 
Later, the Military Justice Act of 1968, again drawing much from 
civilian jurisprudence, added additional modernizing procedures, 
to include the mandatory use of a military judge for all but the most 
minor trials.6 Moreover, the adoption in the 1980s of the Military 
Rules of Evidence from the Federal Rules of Evidence was-and 
is-considered an important step in ensuring fairness of military 
trials and promoting the sense that military courts are "just as 
good" as civilian trials because, after all, it is often said, the rules 
and procedures much mirror each other. 
While such changes certainly address criticisms of the military 
justice system, it is not evident-as is discussed below-that all of 
the changes were actually constitutionally required or have, neces-
sarily, facilitated the administration of military justice, especially 
in the field where it is so needed? The founding fathers, whose 
recent experience with the Revolution left them well aware of war-
time exigencies, seemed to have recognized that all the particu-
lars of Article III trials are not necessary or practical for a military 
disciplinary process, which may require administration in austere 
conditions. Continuing concern about the viability under field 
conditions of an increasingly complex military criminal justice 
system led then secretary of defense Leon Panetta in July 2012 to 
commission a panel to examine the efficacy of the military justice 
system in deployed areas.8 
For its part, the Supreme Court frequently made it clear that it 
suffers no illusions about the need for special considerations as to 
how justice is administered in the military realm. In his superb book 
on military justice, retired Army colonel Larry Morris maintains 
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that the Supreme Court and other courts have a "strong inclination" 
to "defer to the military as a separate society and to set a lenient 
standard of review for decisions that are within the judgment of 
commanders, leaders, and policymakers."9 
Nevertheless, there have been biting critiques. In the 1969 case of 
O'Callaghan v. Parkerl° Justice William O. Douglas remarked that 
while "the Court of Military Appeals takes cognizance of some con-
stitutional rights," courts-martial "as an institution are Singularly 
inept in dealing with the nice subtleties of constitutional law." He 
added, with ill-concealed contempt, that "a civilian trial ... is held 
in an atmosphere conducive to the protection of individual rights, 
while a military trial," Douglas asserted, "is marked by the age-old 
manifest destiny of retributive justice." 
Despite that unflattering assessment, the actual holding of 
O'Callaghan did not dismantle the military justice system. Instead, 
it merely determined that only those offenses that had "service con-
nection" were suitable for military courts. The result of O'Callaghan 
was, however, near chaos in military practice, as courts at both the 
trial and appellate levels struggled to address a myriad of factual 
situations to determine if they were sufficiently related to military 
service for resolution at a court-martial. 
At the same time a process began, much driven by the Court 
of Appeals (perhaps smarting from Douglas's rebuke), to "judicial-
ize" the system away from its traditional commander-centric focus 
toward one more akin to civilian courts. As then captain (later 
brigadier general) John Cooke wrote in 1977, a core principle of 
this effort was embodied in the decisions by the Court of Military 
Appeals that "substantially shifted the balance of power in the sys-
tem by invalidating or restricting powers previously exercised by 
commanders and other line personnel, and by depositing greater 
ultimate authority in the hands oflawyers and judges."ll 
In his dissent in o 'Callaghan , Justice John Harlan warned that 
"the infinite permutations of possibly relevant factors [establish-
ing court-martial jurisdiction] are bound to create confusion and 
proliferate litigation over the [court-martial] jurisdiction issue." 
That proved to be exactly the case, and in 1987 the Supreme Court 
overruled O'Callaghan in U.S. v. Solario. 12 In Solario the Court 
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abandoned the "service connection" test in favor of essentially 
"green card" jurisdiction (in reference to the then green identifi-
cation cards that members of the armed forces carried). It reestab-
lished personal jurisdiction in courts-martial based exclusively on 
the military status of the accused. 
Perceptions about the supposed callousness of the system, and 
even questions about its legitimacy, continue to haunt military 
jurisprudence. As recently as 2009, Chief Justice John Roberts 
cited with approval the 1957 case of Reid v. Covert for the propo-
sition that "traditionally, military justice has been a rough form 
of justice emphasizing summary procedures, speedy convictions 
and stern penalties with a view to maintaining obedience and 
fighting fitness in the ranks."13 What is remarkable about his com-
ment is that what is apparently believed to be a "rough form of 
justice" is, nevertheless, acceptable in the military of a democratic 
superpower. 
Actually, the notion that the military system is a "rough form of 
justice" is not borne out by most objective analyses. A 2012 study 
by the Congressional Research Service amply demonstrates that 
military courts generally provide the same procedural safeguards 
as those found in civilian federal criminal trials.14 In a comparison 
to state court criminal proceedings using a hypothetical case aris-
ing in the state of Virginia as an example, two military attorneys 
found that in nearly every instance the armed forces provided 
as much as or more due process for a defendant. In particular, 
the greater resources available to military defense counsel were 
highlighted. IS 
Rather ironically, it is not altogether clear that the founding 
fathers ever intended courts-martial to involve the elaborate pro-
cedures they employ today. For example, the Constitution specifi-
cally exempts the military from the Fifth Amendment requirement 
for a grand jury indictment. Furthermore, the Court in Covert 
observed that "it has not been clearly settled to what extent the 
Bill of Rights and other protective parts of the Constitution apply 
to military trials."16 That 1957 dictum remains largely true today, 
as a CAAF judge explicitly noted in her 2005 dissent in U.S. v. 
MizgalaY 
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Thus, it can be argued that the rights of service members in disci-
plinary matters are much dependent upon the largesse of Congress.IS 
As the Supreme Court said in the 1953 case of Burns v. Wilson: 
The rights of men in the armed forces must perforce be conditioned to 
meet certain overriding demands of discipline and duty, and the civil 
courts are not the agencies which must determine the precise balance 
to be struck in this adjustment. The Framers expressly entrusted that 
task to Congress.19 
However, for its part, CAAF claims rather inexplicably that "the 
Supreme Court has assumed the Bill of Rights applies to the military" 
and insists it applies "absent military necessity or operational needs."20 
As a practical matter, the effectiveness-and fairness-of the system 
depends upon those who practice in it. These are principally military 
lawyers called JAGs (the acronym for their formal title of "judge advo-
cates"). JAGs are not just licensed lawyers, but today are among the 
best and brightest the legal profession has to offer; in recent years only 
one in twenty applicants has been accepted by the service JAG corps. 
Once a lawyer is licensed in a U.S. jurisdiction and commis-
sioned into one of the services, the UCMJ requires the judge advo-
cate general (the senior lawyer of each of the services) to certify the 
individual as competent to defend persons in courts-martial. In 
addition, the judge advocate general of each of the services has stat-
utory responsibilities to supervise his assigned JAGs and to provide 
oversight of the administration of military justice throughout the 
armed forces. As a check on abuses in the field, JAGs are entitled 
by law to communicate directly with senior JAGs, notwithstanding 
any efforts by field commanders to the contrary.21 
Many offenses prosecuted in the military justice system involve 
the same sort of crimes (e.g., assault, larceny, DWI) denounced in 
any criminal code. Indeed, the third clause of Article 134 of the 
UCMJ (the "catchall" article22) permits the assimilation of virtu-
ally the entire federal criminal code into military law. There are, 
however, limits to integrating civilian law into the code. In the 2012 
case of u.s. v. Hayes, CAAF refused to permit bootstrapping state 
criminal codes into the UCMJ.23 
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Even among "conventional" offenses there are some differences 
based on the special considerations of military service. For exam-
ple, Article 134 criminalizes deaths that are the result of simple neg-
ligence, a standard of culpability commonly found in civil lawsuits 
but not in the criminal courts. In the 1979 case of u.s. v. Kick, the 
Court of Military Appeals explained, 
There is a special need in the military to make the killing of another 
as a result of simple negligence a criminal act. This is because of the 
extensive use, handling and operation in the course of official duties of 
such dangerous instruments as weapons, explosives, aircraft, vehicles, 
and the like. The danger to others from careless acts is so great that 
society demands protection.24 
Of course, the UCMJ contains a variety of offenses that are unique 
to the military. Absence offenses are a good example. Desertion-
which is quitting one's post with the intent to stay away permanent-
ly-carries the death penalty if done in time of war. Quite obviously, 
no armed force can tolerate troops abandoning their duties, espe-
cially in the face of combat. Lesser absences are also criminalized. 
In the military, being even a minute late for work during peace-
time is a crime punishable by up to a month in jail. Of course, that 
measure of punishment is rarely imposed, but "failure to repair" (as 
lateness is termed in the military) commonly results in an adminis-
trative forfeiture of payor even a reduction in rank. 
The criminalization of absence offenses is one illustration of 
how the UCMJ helps create a mind-set of obedience and attention 
to detail that is so necessary for success in war. Another example-
and one that often perplexes civilians-is dereliction of duty. There 
are several dereliction offenses, depending on whether the failure to 
execute an assignment was willful, negligent, or the result of culpa-
ble inefficiency. 
The MCM does, however, make it clear that when the failure to 
complete that task is genuinely the result of inability-such as when 
a soldier repeatedly fails to pass his marksmanship test despite ear-
nest effort-he is not criminally liable (although he may find himself 
required to put in many extra hours of practice, to include time that 
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otherwise might have been off-duty). Still, when a military mem-
ber's failure to do his duty is, in fact, willful or negligent, then the 
punishment is more severe than for someone who fails to complete 
a project for a civilian company or organization. 
The UCMJ also lists a number of offenses designed to help control 
the natural terror that combat can produce in individuals. Besides 
desertion in wartime, capital punishment may also be imposed for 
behaviors that may seem rather innocuous or even inexplicable to 
civilians, but is understandable given the paramount interests of 
a military organization at war. Thus, "sleeping on post," failing to 
do the "utmost" to "encounter the enemy," and "shamefully" sur-
rendering are all death penalty offenses. Additionally, execution 
is authorized for "cowardly conduct," which the MCM defines as 
"misbehavior motivated by fear."2s 
To be sure, a serviceman's mental state can exonerate him if-as 
is typical in civilian jurisprudence-he suffers from "a severe mental 
disease or defect" and as a result of that he is "unable to appreciate the 
nature and quality" of the act or its "wrongfulness."26 Post-traumatic 
stress disorder (PTSD), for example, does not, per se, excuse mis-
conduct, absent a showing it has the effect discussed above; it may, 
however, be raised as a matter of mitigation of any sentence.27 
Despite the rather large number ofUCMJ offenses that carry the 
death penalty, no service member has been executed since 1961. Six 
soldiers are currently on death row at the U.S. DiSciplinary Barracks 
in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas,28 but none is there for a conviction for 
uniquely military offenses; all are sentenced for crimes that include 
premeditated murder as at least one of the charges. 
The armed forces necessarily place a premium on the obedience 
of orders. In the 1890 case of In Re Grimley, the Supreme Court 
noted that an "army is not a deliberative body .... [Its] law is that of 
obedience. No question can be left open as to the right to command 
in the officer, or the duty of obedience in the soldier."29 In the 1983 
case of Chappell v. Wallace, the Court was equally unambiguous 
when it said, "The inescapable demands of military discipline and 
obedience to orders cannot be taught on battlefields; the habit of 
immediate compliance with military procedures and orders must 
be virtually reflex, with no time for debate or reflection."30 
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Nonetheless, military law imposes no obligation to obey an 
unlawful order. Although all orders are presumed lawful, and sol-
diers disobey them at their peril, there are limits to the "orders" 
defense. In the infamous Vietnam-era My Lai massacre case, 
Army lieutenant William Calley claimed his murderous behavior 
was in response to superior orders he had allegedly received. The 
Court of Military Appeals, after noting that Calley was "convicted 
of the premeditated murder of 22 infants, children, women, and 
old men" who were his prisoners, rejected out of hand the asser-
tion that Calley's intelligence was such that he might not have 
known that the supposed order was unlawful. The court dryly 
observed that "whether Lieutenant Calley was the most ignorant 
person in the United States Army in Vietnam, or the most intel-
ligent, he must be presumed to know that he could not kill the 
people involved here."3l 
However, when an order is not actually unlawful, the fact that it 
may be unreasonable or contrary to one's personal belief does not 
excuse disobedience. Indeed, the MCM explicitly states that the 
"dictates of a personal conscience, religion, or personal philosophy 
cannot justify or excuse the disobedience of an otherwise lawful 
order."32 Thus, in U.S. v. Rockwood, an Army captain's conviction 
for offenses related to his departure from his base against his supe-
rior orders during the 1994 Haiti relief mission was sustained on 
appeal despite his claim that he had a moral and legal obligation 
under international human rights law to inspect the admittedly 
deplorable conditions of Haiti's National Penitentiary.33 Such deci-
sions, the court found, were the prerogative of command, not of 
individual subordinate soldiers. 
Among the more fascinating aspects of the UCMJ are the pro-
visions related to commissioned officers. Subordinates can be 
punished not just for disobeying officers, but also for being disre-
spectful in acts or language. In this regard, the MCM pointedly 
states that "truth is no defense." At the same time, however, officers 
are held accountable in ways enlisted personnel are not. In finding 
that officers can be sent to trial for offenses that are typically han-
dled administratively when involving enlisted personnel, the CMA 
observed that 
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the Armed Services comprise a hierarchical society, which is based 
on military rank. Within that society commissioned officers have for 
many purposes been set apart from other groups. Since officers have 
special privileges and hold special positions of honor, it is not unrea-
sonable that they be held to a high standard of accountability. 34 
One of the special restrictions placed on officers is the prohi-
bition in Article 88 against "contemptuous words" against the 
president, the secretary of defense, and other civilian officials. 
Though the MCM cautions that "private conversations should not 
ordinarily be charged" and that adverse criticism "even though 
emphatically expressed" ordinarily should not be alleged, speech 
is criminalized in a way that would be unconstitutional in civil-
ian society. 35 
In one of the rare instances where an Article 88 violation was 
prosecuted, Lieutenant Henry H. Howe was convicted for attend-
ing a demonstration in 1965 in El Paso, Texas, while carrying a 
sign that said "LET'S HAVE MORE THAN A 'CHOICE' BETWEEN PETTY, 
IGNORANT, FACISTS IN 1968" and, on the other side, "END JOHNSON'S 
FACIST AGGRESSION IN VIETNAM." The CMA upheld the conviction 
against First Amendment challenges, finding that what Article 88 
properly sought to "avoid is the impairment of discipline and the 
promotion of insubordination by an and that under the cir-
cumstance the conduct constituted "a clear and present danger to 
diScipline within our armed services."36 
Unlike Article 88, which is rarely alleged, Article 133:-which 
denounces "conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentlemen"-is 
not infrequently included on charge sheets involving officers. 
In another Vietnam-era case, Parker v. Levy, the Supreme Court 
examined whether "conduct unbecoming an officer" was too vague 
a standard to which to attach criminal liability.37 Levy, an Army 
doctor and commissioned officer, was convicted for making state-
ments to enlisted troops such as that he did not "see why any col-
ored soldier would go to Viet Nam: they should refuse to go to Viet 
Nam and if sent should refuse to fight" and that "Special Forces per-
sonnel are liars and thieves and killers of peasants and murderers of 
women and children." 
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In rejecting Levy's habeas corpus petition,38 the Supreme Court 
observed that it had "long recognized that the military is, by neces-
sity, a specialized society separate from civilian society" and that 
the "military has ... by necessity, developed laws and traditions of 
its own." Those differences, the Court said, arose from the fact that 
"the primary business of armies and navies is to fight or be ready to 
fight wars should the occasion arise." 
Thus, the Court believed that notwithstanding the broad lan-
guage of Article 133, Levy could have no reasonable expectation that 
using the words he did under the circumstances would be anything 
other than violative of the UCMJ provision. In so concluding, the 
Court pointed out that the "fundamental necessity for obedience, 
and the consequent necessity for imposition of diScipline, may ren-
der permissible within the military that which would be constitu-
tionally impermissible outside it." Today, Article 133 charges often 
incorporate the elements of a wide range of offenses, to include rela-
tively minor ones. Although prosecutors are required to prove the 
additional element that the misconduct was "conduct unbecoming 
an officer," any conviction permits the dismissal of the officer (the 
equivalent of a dishonorable discharge for an enlisted person). 
Of course, not all violations of the UCMJ automatically result in 
a court-martial. Commanders are urged to attempt to resolve mis-
behavior at the lowest possible level, and most disciplinary mea-
sures are administrative, not judicial. For example, commanders 
and supervisors will employ corrective measures to include oral 
and written counselings, admonitions, and reprimands. For the 
vast majority of troops, these administrative tools are sufficient for 
correcting behavior. 
More aggravated situations, yet still "minor offenses," can be han-
dIed by a commander via a nonjudicial procedure under Article 15 
of the UCMJ.39 These are summary administrative proceedings, 
often conducted by commanders without the involvement of legal 
personnel, that permit the imposition of limited fines, restrictions, 
extra duties, and-where facilities are available-correctional cus-
tody. Correctional custody is designed to be akin to confinement, 
but more of a reversion to the strict regime of boot camp in order to 
reinstill military virtues in the offender and return him to duty. (It 
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is reported that punishment pursuant to Article 15 is what is being 
recommended in the December 2011 incident involving the burning 
of Korans in Afghanistan.40) In cases where an individual is deemed 
unsuitable for further service, but not for reasons warranting a 
court-martial, administrative discharge may be directed. 
If a particular disciplinary situation appears to warrant more 
than administrative disposition, criminal charges are "preferred" 
on the accused as the first step in the court-martial process. While 
military law permits any person "subject to the Code" to prefer 
charges, it usually falls to the immediate commander to do so. 
Depending upon the seriousness of the allegation, the comman-
der may decide-with the advice of his or her JAG-to dismiss 
the charges or to resolve them administratively. The commander, 
if authorized to convene courts-martial, can also "refer" the case 
to a summary or special court-martial. If, however, the charges are 
serious enough, he may order a formal investigation pursuant to 
Article 32 of the UCMJ. 
Article 32 investigations are often considered to be a statutory 
substitute for the grand jury process, even though the Constitution 
explicitly exempts military cases from that requirement. In practice, 
Article 32 hearings are much different from grand jury proceedings 
in that they are usually public proceedings with the accused pres-
ent and accompanied by counsel. The accused (or, more likely, his 
lawyer) is permitted to interrogate government witnesses and call 
his own. 
In manyways, the Article 32 hearings have evolved into mini-trials 
where allegations are sometimes "litigated," even though the hear-
ings are, technically, merely investigations. The hearing officer, 
ordinarily a JAG, will draft a report that will be forwarded to the 
commander along with the assembled evidence and transcripts of 
testimony. The hearing officer will make a nonbinding recommen-
dation as to how the charges should be resolved. 
Several types of courts-martial exist to which a commander can 
refer charges: summary, special, and general. They are mainly dis-
tinguished by the maximum punishments that can be imposedY 
A summary court can jail a soldier for thirty days, but not impose 
a discharge. A special court-martial can confine a defendant for up 
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to a year, and the sentence can include a bad conduct discharge. A 
general court-martial can adjudge any punishment up to the maxi-
mum authorized for the crime, to include death and a dishonorable 
discharge. Besides the stigma attached to a "bad conduct discharge" 
and a "dishonorable discharge" (called a "dismissal" when imposed 
upon an officer), these punitive separations can cause the loss of eli-
gibility for many federal and state veterans' benefits. 
The court-martial itself draws much from civilian trial processes. 
One key difference is that the "jurors" (called "members" in military 
parlance) are not randomly selected, as they generally are in civilian 
cases, but rather selected by the commander, based, as the UCMJ 
requires, on a determination that the officers are "best qualified by 
reason of age, education, training, experience, length of service, and 
judicial temperament."42 Though the concern is often understand-
ably raised that a commander could "pack" a court panel to achieve 
a desired result, in practice such is rarely the case. 
There are a number of reasons for this, beginning with the fact 
that the independence of the officers selected (the panel may include 
up to one-third enlisted members if an enlisted accused so requests) 
is protected by Article 37 of the UCMJ, which prohibits any effort 
to coerce or unlawfully influence the members or, for that matter, 
the military judge or counsel for either side. In addition, the appel-
late courts, and especially CAAF, have been exceptionally rigorous 
in their effort to root out "unlawful command influence," which it 
has long condemned as the "mortal enemy of the military justice 
system."43 
Court-martial panels also differ from most civilian courts in 
their size, as well as the manner in which they come to their 
findings. Summary courts-martial consist of a single officer, 
while special courts need at least three members, and general 
courts must have at least five. If the accused does not choose to 
be tried by military judge alone, his case will be decided by a 
secret written ballot of the members during their closed delib-
eration. In military cases, however, a conviction requires only a 
two-thirds agreement of the panel; there are no "hung juries" in 
military trials. In addition, the sentence also is decided by the 
members (if the accused does not elect trial by military judge 
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alone). Like the finding, a sentence requires a two-thirds vote, 
unless the sentence includes confinement for more than ten years 
(requiring a three-fourths vote) or death (unanimous agreement 
is mandated). 
Besides incarceration, military sentences can include repri-
mands, fines and forfeiture of pay, hard labor without confine-
ment, reduction in grade, and a punitive discharge. Although not 
yet tested for constitutionality, death is the only authorized pun-
ishment for spying in violation of Article 106 of the UCMJ. Other 
military death penalty cases usually require procedures similar to 
those found in civilian jurisprudence, including the presentation of 
aggravating factors. 
The appellate process for court-martial convictions is more 
elaborate than that typically available in civilian settings. 
Although its extent largely depends upon the severity of the pun-
ishment imposed, it typically begins with review by the com-
mander who convened the court-martial. That review, aided 
by the advice of a judge advocate, cannot result in a reversal of 
acquittal to any charge or any increase in sentence, but only in 
the approval of the adjudged findings and sentence, or a mitiga-
tion of either in some way. 
Again, depending upon the severity of the sentence, the next 
level of review ordinarily is conducted by the court of review of 
each individual service. What is unusual about these courts is 
that they are empowered not only to act on errors of law, but also 
to conduct a fresh (de novo) review of the facts and overturn the 
case-even in the absence of legal error-if they find the proof 
insufficient. Moreover, they may reassess the appropriateness of 
the sentence and diminish it if they wish. Essentially, they can 
only affirm the decision or act in some way to the defendant's 
benefit. 
The next level of appeal is to the Court of Appeals for the Armed 
Forces. As already noted, the CAAF is empowered to review only 
errors of law (except in the Coast Guard, the judges in service 
courts of review are military appellate judges). Unlike the service 
courts of review, however, CAAF's powers are limited to errors of 
law. Beyond CAAF, appeal can be made to the Supreme Court, 
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but only in limited circumstances. As the Congressional Research 
Service put it, 
[The Supreme Court's 1 power to review military cases generally extends 
only to cases that the CAAF has also reviewed. For this reason, the 
CAAF's discretion over the acceptance or denial of appeals often func-
tions as a gatekeeper for military appellants' access to Supreme Court 
review. If the CAAF denies an appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court will 
typically lack the authority to review the decision. In contrast, crimi-
nal appellants in Article III courts have an automatic right of appeal 
to federal courts of appeals and then a right to petition the Supreme 
Court for review.44 
An issue related to military justice-but very separate-is the mat-
ter of military commissions. Military commissions have a long 
history in the United States. They were used during the Mexican 
War, and thousands of Americans were tried by military com-
mission during the Civil War, including anti-Lincoln conspira-
tors. However, in 1866 the Supreme Court in the case of Ex Parte 
Milligan found unconstitutional the domestic use of military com-
missions against nonbelligerents in areas where the courts were 
still functioning.45 
During World War II, civilians in Hawaii were tried by mili-
tary tribunals under the authority of the Hawaii Organic Act, which 
permitted declarations of martial law. However, the Supreme Court 
applied its Milligan precedent in finding that despite the statutory 
authorization, such trials were unconstitutional where U.S. civilian 
courts were able to function.46 
Nevertheless, when German saboteurs-including a naturalized 
American citizen, Herbert Haupt-were delivered to U.S. shores bya 
Nazi submarine in 1942, the Court distinguished Milligan. In deny-
ing the saboteurs' petition for habeas corpus, the Supreme Court 
concluded in Ex Parte Quirin that "those who, during time of war, 
pass surreptitiously from enemy territory into our own, discard-
ing their uniforms upon entry, for the commission of hostile acts 
involving destruction oflife or property, have the status of unlawful 
combatants punishable as such by military commission."47 
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As to the American citizen among the saboteurs, the Court said: 
Citizenship in the United States of an enemy belligerent does not 
relieve him from the consequences of a belligerency which is unlawful 
because in violation of the law of war. Citizens who associate them-
selves with the military arm of the enemy government, and with its 
aid, guidance and direction enter this country bent on hostile acts are 
enemy belligerents within the meaning of the Hague Convention and 
the law of war. 
Those "consequences" included being subject to trial by a military 
commission. Six of the eight-including Haupt-were executed 
within weeks of their conviction. 
Following World War II, General Tomoyuki Yamashita, the 
Japanese commander in the Philippines, where horrific atrocities 
were committed by his troops, was tried by military commission. 
Charged not with personally committing or ordering war crimes, 
but rather with "unlawfully disregarding and failing to discharge 
his duty as a commander to control the acts of members of his com-
mand by permitting them to commit war crimes," he was tried 
and convicted by military commission. In denying his application 
for leave to file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus and writ of 
prohibition, the Supreme Court found his commission trial law-
ful, even though hostilities had ended.48 Yamashita was hanged on 
February 23, 1946. 
The case has been widely criticized, but still stands for the 
important principle of command accountability, respondeat supe-
rior, the concept that commanders are responsible for the actions 
of their subordinates. Today, command responsibility incorporates 
requirements for some "information of knowledge that triggers a 
duty to act" with respect to "ongoing or anticipated law of war vio-
lations by subordinates," as well as a "causal relationship between 
the commander's omission and the war crimes committed by the 
subordinate."49 
In the aftermath of 9/11, military commissions took on something 
of an unprecedented role when President George W. Bush issued 
his "Military Order" concerning detention of terrorism suspects, 
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as well as their potential trial by military commission. so It seems 
as if the design for the commission process used an improved ver-
sion of the much-respected Nuremberg trials as the template. Those 
proceedings were not, however, military commissions conducted 
under u.s. law, but rather were international tribunals. 
Regardless, it is doubtful that the processes used at Nuremberg 
could survive scrutiny today (e.g., the Nuremberg defendants did 
not have the right to remain silent, or challenge the impartial-
ity of the fact-finding judges). Indeed, William Shawcross argues 
that Nuremberg offered defendants fewer rights than did the mili-
tary commissions created by the Bush administration. According 
to Shawcross, any "German in the dock at Nuremberg would be 
astonished to learn of his rights, privileges, and entitlements, if 
he were suddenly transferred by time machine to the court in 
Guantanamo."SI 
In any event, in 2006 the Supreme Court in Hamdan v. 
Rumsfelds2 held that the military commissions devised by President 
Bush violated both the UCMJ and international law. This gener-
ated a number of statutory and regulatory changes, which ended 
with the implementation of the Military Commission Act of 2009.53 
Although some scholars remain dissatisfied with commissions as 
formulated today,S4 a comparison with courts-martial under the 
UCMJ suggests that the commissions are generally on firm legal 
footing, even as issues such as the scope of the charges triable by 
military commissions persist. 55 
While courts-martial remain distinct from military commis-
sions, an issue has emerged with them that relates to a fundamental 
concern of the commission cases: When can military authorities try 
a civilian who is not an enemy belligerent? As Professor Stephen I. 
Vladeck points out, "The Supreme Court repeatedly recognized cat-
egorical constitutional limits on the military's power to try civilians 
(including contractors), at least during 'peacetime."'s6 Additionally, 
Vladeck notes that the CMA invalidated trials of contractors dur-
ing the Vietnam War: because the conflict was never formally 
"declared" a war, it did not fit the statutory construct permitting 
the trial of "civilians accompanying the force" as provided by the 
UCMJ.S7 
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However, after a foreign contract employee of the Army assaulted 
another contract employee in Iraq in 2008, the alleged offender 
found himself tried by a u.s. court-martial. In discussing jurisdic-
tion, the Army court of review observed that the law had changed 
since the Vietnam-era cases: 
In 2006, Congress amended Article 2(a)(1O), which had long autho-
rized UCMJ jurisdiction over "persons serving with or accompanying 
an armed force in the field" during "time of war." This amendment 
was effected by replacing the temporal requirement of a "time of war" 
with "time of declared war or contingency operation."58 
Because of the statutory revision, the Army court concluded that 
since the incident occurred at an overseas combat outpost during 
actual hostilities, court-martial jurisdiction was properly found. 
CAAF agreed and affirmed the conviction,59 but the case is likely to 
make its way to the Supreme Court. 
Military law today is a well-developed corpus of jurisprudence, 
but one not without controversy. Incidents from the wars in Iraq 
and Afghanistan indicate an erosion of discipline.6o Allegations that 
soldiers engaged in the killing of civilians for "sport" in 2010 61 were 
followed by accounts in late 2011 and 2012 of other acts of indisci-
pline, including reports of troops burning Korans,62 urinating on 
Taliban corpses,63 and posing with body parts of enemy fighters,64 
not to mention the shocking allegations of the cold-blooded murder 
of seventeen Afghans civilians by a U.S. Army sergeant.65 
Senior military officers and defense officials admit they are 
deeply troubled by the events,66 because they keenly understand the 
destructive effect of indiscipline on the military's ability to accom-
plish its mission. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta told troops 
recently that "these days, it takes only seconds for one picture to 
suddenly become an international headline ... and those headlines 
can impact the mission we're engaged in, they can put your fellow 
service members at risk, they can hurt morale, and they can damage 
our standing in the world."67 
Panetta is echoing a point that former commandant of the 
Marine Corps General Charles C. Krulak made in 1999: that given 
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the enormous power of instant, worldwide media, every act carries 
potentially strategic consequences, even those committed by very 
junior troops in remote locations. Krulak presciently explained, 
In many cases, the individual Marine will be the most conspicuous 
symbol of American foreign policy and will potentially influence not 
only the immediate tactical situation, but the operational and stra-
tegic levels as well. His actions, therefore, will directly impact the 
outcome of the larger operation; and he will become .,. the Strategic 
Corporal.68 
Clearly, misconduct can have a real effect on operational success in 
the twenty-first century. Many defense strategists cite the collapse 
of discipline that led to the detainee abuse scandal at Abu Ghraib as 
one of the worst setbacks the U.S armed forces suffered since 9/11, 
much because of the propaganda victory that it handed the insur-
gents. General David Petraeus has said that ''Abu Ghraib and other 
situations like that are non-biodegradable. They don't go away. The 
enemy continues to beat you with them like a stick."69 
There can be many explanations for erosion in discipline, but one 
aspect may be the military justice system itself, and the outcome of 
the 2005 Haditha incident in Iraq could be illustrative. This case 
arose from a situation where twenty-four innocent Iraqi civilians 
were killed by U.S. Marines in a botched response to an improvised 
explosive device attack on a convoy. Of the eight original suspects, 
six had charges dropped, one was tried and acquitted, and the last 
accused-Staff Sergeant Frank Wuterich-negotiated a plea agree-
ment in 2012 that limited his punishment to a demotion but no jail 
time. Many military justice experts were at a loss to explain the 
apparent leniency in his case, as well as the apparent inability to 
convict any of the others allegedly involved.70 
However, the complex evidentiary rules-almost identical to 
those applicable in the most staid federal courtroom in an American 
suburb-may have also played a role. The New York Times reported 
that beyond missteps by military prosecutors and a reluctance of 
decision makers to second-guess the actions of troops in combat, 
"collecting physical evidence and finding witnesses can be difficult 
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because the killings often occur in unstable and dangerous areas, 
and the cases often come to light only after time has passed."7l It 
is no surprise, therefore, that after reports of the killing of seven-
teen Afghan civilians in March 2012, CNN reported that "critics are 
questioning the military's ability to conduct the transparent, speedy 
investigation demanded by Afghanistan in the case."72 
Decades of "civilianizing" and "judicializing" of the mili-
tary justice system may have altered the system beyond what the 
Constitution would require for military jurisprudence, and cer-
tainly far beyond the "rough justice" of ChiefJustice Roberts's belief. 
Indeed, as suggested above, the process today may be too cumber-
some and complex for the battlefield environments where it is needed 
to function. 73 Major Franklin Rosenblatt presents a disturbing pic-
ture of the current situation in a 2010 article, "Non-Deployable: The 
Court-Martial System in Combat from 2001-2009."74 According to 
Rosenblatt, "After-action reports from deployed judge advocates 
show a nearly unanimous recognition that the full-bore application 
of military justice was impossible in the combat zone."75 
Rosenblatt cites a catalog of reasons for the troubles in apply-
ing the UCMJ in remote areas, ranging from logistical difficulties 
to procedural shortcomings to attitudinal issues, and warns that 
"deployed courts-martial may someday become a relic of military 
history rather than a viable commander's too1."76 Saddling com-
manders in austere locations with adhering to many of the same 
intricacies of a domestic judicial system may be proving to be too 
much. Lieutenant Colonel Michael Stahlman, a Marine JAG, admits 
that "commanders often perceive the military justice system as a 
roadblock instead of an effective leadership too1."77 
Whether UCMJ complexities and burdens are the cause or not, it 
appears that commanders may be avoiding taking the disciplinary 
action they should, and this can create a dangerous attitude among 
the troops. In fact, a new Army report suggests commanders are 
"opting out" of the system: 
The rise in crime in contrast to the decline in disciplinary action (e.g., 
court martial, summary court martial, Article 15), retention of mul-
tiple felony offenders and the deliberate change in terms of reference 
262 THE MODERN AMERICAN MILITARY 
regarding criminal misconduct all point to a softening in the percep-
tion of criminality .... Subtle changes in policy language (e.g., remov-
ing the term "criminal" from "serious criminal misconduct"), which 
may inadvertently shift leader perception of criminality, will not 
change the nature of the criminal act or alter its impact on victims, 
good order and discipline, and unit readiness?8 
Still, some experts insist that the system can work, even in the field. 
In a recent article, Major E. John Gregory cites his own Army expe-
riences in Iraq and argues that they demonstrate that 
when a proper emphasis is placed on military justice in theater by both 
the command and military justice practitioners, the court-martial 
system is a fully deployable system of justice which is not overly bur-
densome, meets the command's disciplinary needs, and is highly pro-
tective of an accused's rights?9 
Encouraging words for sure, but the trick is obtaining the "proper 
emphasis" under circumstances where there are multiple opera-
tional demands on a commander's time and resources. The answer is 
not, however, to ship miscreants home, as some have suggested, but 
rather to examine the "civilianized" processes to determine which 
ones are truly constitutionally required-or prudent normatively-
and streamline the system accordingly to make it compatible with 
the needs of diScipline in the twenty-first century. 
The ability to impose discipline, in situ, is vitally important to any 
military organization in combat, as otherwise misconduct can become 
a ticket out of a war zone. At the height of the Vietnam War in 1968, a 
court-martial was conducted in an underground bunker at Khe Sanh. 
As recorded by Gary Solis in his masterly Marines and Military Law in 
Vietnam: Trial by Fire, all the proceedings were conducted as the enemy 
poured intense artillery, rocket, and mortar fire onto the isolated out-
post.30 The court-martial acquitted the accused of smoking marijuana, 
but convicted him of sleeping on post and sentenced him to reduction 
in grade and forfeitures. The prosecutor aptly noted that the "sentence 
was appropriate" because the "accused was not sent back to the brig or 
otherwise allowed to escape the confines of Khe Sanh."31 
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Interestingly, some nations-including especially heirs to the 
British military justice system-are increasingly civilianizing their 
systems even more than the United States has done, often with ref-
erence to resolving military disciplinary matters in civilian courtS.82 
Casting cases to civilian courts does not, however, necessarily pro-
vide the desired justice. Consider the case of former Marine ser-
geant Jose Luis Nazario. 
Although retired military members may be subject to 
court-martial, military jurisdiction generally terminates at the end 
of an enlistment or when a military member is otherwise discharged 
without retirement. 83 Thus, Nazario, who was discharged before alle-
gations related to the killing of four civilians in Iraq were resolved, 
had to be tried in a civilian court. Following his acquittal in 2008, 
news reports related that "several jurors acknowledged that they also 
did not feel qualified to judge a Marine's actions in the midst of a 
battle."84 One juror said "she hoped the verdict would send a message 
to the troops in Iraq" to the effect that they would "realize that they 
shouldn't be second-guessed, that we support them and know that 
they're doing the right thing."85 
Another challenge to the military justice system today relates 
to the handling of sexual assault allegations. In 2006, Congress, 
spurred primarily by heartrending but anecdotal claims of mis-
handled cases, and dissatisfied with the military's efforts to address 
these alleged incidents, revised the sexual assault offense found in 
Article 120 of the UCMJ. The result was such a bloated and con-
fusing statute that in 2011 CAAF found key provisions unconsti-
tutional,86 necessitating a complete legislative replacement (which 
itself may be subject to challenge).87 
The military's difficulty in dealing with sexual assault cases may 
seem to be a manifestation of the victimization of women in an 
organization overwhelmingly populated by males (women compose 
only 14.6 percent of the 1.4 million active-duty service members88). 
The New York Times, for example, claims that it "is even harder for 
military women to get away from abusers they work with or for; 
they can't just quit their jobs or leave a combat zone."89 This misper-
ceives the issue. A 2010 Department of Defense study did show that 
a higher percentage of women (4-4 percent) than men (0.9 percent) 
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reported "unwanted sexual contact."90 However, the translation 
of those percentages into actual numbers shows that considerably 
more men (approximately 11,288) perceived themselves as victims of 
"unwanted sexual contact" than did women (approximately 9,433). 
The armed forces have made an extraordinary effort to crack 
down on sexual assaults, establishing a web of victim's resources, 
special policies and reports, training, and-significantly-an 
increased emphasis on prosecution.91 However, criticism-espe-
cially in Congress-continues unabated.92 Accordingly, further leg-
islation is now before Congress, a proposal called the "STOP Act."93 
This legislation has a number of features, including the establish-
ment of a Sexual Assault Oversight and Response Council, separate 
from the military chain of command, who would, in turn, appoint 
a "director of military prosecution" with authority over sexual 
offenses in the armed forces.94 
This proposal to remove field commanders from acting in this 
particular class of offenses is controversial. Army major general 
Gary Patton, the newly appointed head of the military's Sexual 
Assault Prevention and Response Office, warns that "if you were 
to take the diSciplinary component and put it into some external, 
centralized, whatever, body, independent, apart from the chain of 
the command, you've just removed the commander from the prob-
lem and tied the commander's hands."95 His predecessor, Air Force 
major general Mary Kay Hertog, agreed with having more senior 
commanders take the initial action in these cases but added, 
Some have argued that allegations of sexual assault are best addressed out-
side the chain of command. I disagree .... [Keeping the] initial disposition 
of these cases within the military chain of command ... will ensure that 
the military itself remains responsible for addressing this critically impor-
tant issue. Experience has shown time and again that strong internal lead-
ership is effective in bringing about major change. The chain of command 
must ensure justice and be held to account for the consequences.96 
Furthermore, the STOP Act proposal seems to assume that the 
military's difficulties with sexual assault prosecution are somehow 
uniquely the result of command indifference (or worse). Indeed, in 
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its proposed "findings," the STOP Act does cast aspersions on mili-
tary officers by stating that the "great deference afforded command 
discretion raises serious concerns about conflicts of interest and the 
potential for abuse of power." However, the American public-if not 
Congress-rates military officers second only to nurses as the profes-
sion having the highest honesty and ethics.97 (Members of Congress 
were rated the lowest.) Similarly, an April 2012 poll showed the U.S. 
public had the most confidence in military leaders, and the least 
in those of Congress.98 Thus, whatever negative view Congress may 
have as to the potential for abuse by military commanders, it would 
not seem to be shared by the public. 
Moreover, the military's challenges with sexual assault cases 
are hardly unique: the Department of Justice, while citing increas-
ing civilian prosecutions, concedes that in the United States gen-
erally, "sexual assault cases have been underreported and had low 
prosecution rates."99 In any event, reports in December 2011 indi-
cate that "military commanders sent about 70 percent more cases 
to courts-martial that started as rape or aggravated sexual-assault 
allegations than they did in 2009."100 Additionally, Reuters reported 
in August 2012 that military "commanders routinely lack sufficient 
evidence to prosecute [sexual assault] cases." 
Importantly, as in any justice system, it is a "fundamental right" 
of a service member to be subject to court-martial only where the 
evidence reasonably establishes that he or she has committed a tri-
able offense. WI Clearly, prudence is necessary, especially when there 
are a growing number of cases where, but for DNA technology, 
persons wrongly convicted of sexual assault would continue to lan-
guish in jail. The National Registry of Exonerations compiled by 
University of Michigan Law School and Northwestern University 
recently reported, for example, that there have been more than 
two thousand wrongful convictions for serious crimes since 1989 
(the year DNA exonerating evidence became readily available).102 
Issues can also arise about misidentification and, occaSionally, false 
reports.103 It is simply counterfactual to blame military command-
ers for the difficulties associated with sexual assault cases, as these 
same matters would, one would assume, similarly impact the spe-
cial directorate the draft legislation proposes to establish. 
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In addition, referring cases to an office with an obvious agenda 
to increase prosecutions and, presumably, convictions, raises seri-
ous questions not just about impartiality, qua impartiality, but also 
regarding the special "enemy" of the military justice system: unlaw-
ful command influence.104 As a matter of law, improper influences 
on the military justice system can arise just as readily from politi-
cians and others as from commanders formally part of the process. !Os 
Reports are already emerging that "the politics of rape are tainting 
[the] military justice system," with one defense counsel claiming 
that "reality is they're charging more and more people with bogus 
cases just to show that they do take it seriously."106 
In fact, a McClatchy Newspaper analysis "found that the military 
is prosecuting a growing number of rape and sexual assault allega-
tions, including highly contested cases that would be unlikely to go 
to trial in many civilian courts."107 Concerns have been raised, it 
is reported, "that the anti-rape campaign of advocacy groups and 
Congress is influencing" commanders to send undeserving cases to 
tria1.108 According to Charles Feldmann, a former military and civil-
ian prosecutor turned civilian defense attorney, a military officer is 
"not going to put his career at risk on an iffy rape case by not pros-
ecuting it," because ifhe "dismisses a case and there's political back-
lash, he's going to take some real career heat over that dismissal."109 
Efforts, such as the STOP Act, to diminish the role of commanders 
in military justice matters need to be approached with great caution, as 
doing so upends thousands of years of military practice and tradition 
built on hard-won experience. Those countries that have taken similar 
steps in recent years have found themselves struggling with disciplin-
ary processes that are out of sync with battlefield realities, as well as 
the overall needs of armed organizations responsible for the nation's 
defenseYo It should not be forgotten that, as the Supreme Court said 
in Haig v. Agee, "It is obvious and unarguable that no governmental 
interest is more compelling than the security of the Nation."lll 
The u.S. military justice system, despite many challenges, can, 
will-and must-continue to sustain the most powerful armed 
force the world has ever known. While its legitimacy, especially 
in an era of an all-volunteer military, depends upon the percep-
tion as well as the fact of fairness, it also needs to be effective and 
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efficient. Achieving that aim requires thoughtful prudence, well 
grounded in the pragmatism generated by operational experience, 
and tempered by the values and principles of a liberal democracy. 
The importance of this responsibility cannot be overstated. As the 
renowned Roman military thinker Vegetius sagely warned, "No 
nation can be happy or secure that is remiss and negligent in the 
discipline of its troops." 
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